Design and Field Evaluation of PassSec: Raising and Sustaining Web Surfer Risk Awareness by Volkamer, Melanie et al.
Design and Field Evaluation of PassSec: Raising
and Sustaining Web Surfer Risk Awareness
Melanie Volkamer1,3, Karen Renaud2, Gamze Canova1, Benjamin Reinheimer1,
and Kristoffer Braun1
1 Technische Universita¨t Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany
name.surname@secuso.org
2 University of Glasgow, Glasgow, U.K.
karen.renaud@glasgow.ac.uk
3 Karlstad University, Karlstad, Sweden
Abstract. This paper presents PassSec, a Firefox Add-on that raises
user awareness about safe and unsafe password entry while they surf
the web. PassSec comprises a two-stage approach: highlighting as the
web page loads, then bringing up a just-in-time helpful dialogue when
the user demonstrates an intention to enter a password on an unsafe web
page. PassSec was developed using a human-centred design approach. We
performed a field study with 31 participants that showed that PassSec
significantly reduces the number of logins on websites where password
entry is unsafe.
1 Introduction
Web surfers can be at risk: (1) if the website itself is masquerading as the genuine
entity; (2) the web page does not secure communications with the server by
using HTTPS. In this paper, we focus on the latter as 10% of the top 100 sites
in the study country currently fail to do this (including the 8th, 9th and 11th
most popular sites, including three major email providers). Insecure transmission
has two consequences: communications being sniffed or the page itself being
manipulated by third parties. Web browsers could refuse to load insecure pages
but this relies on their being able to judge situations with 100% reliability, an
unrealistic expectation. Failing this, users need to be wary, to protect themselves
when pages are insecure.
Popular web browsers currently do a poor job of supporting users in this
respect. Firstly, the main security indicator (HTTP or HTTPS with a padlock) is
usually placed in the address bar where it is easily missed [2, 12, 15, 34, 23]. Sec-
ondly, web browsers usually reassure rather than signal problems, with indicators
appearing only when communications are secured (padlock and/or highlighted in
green). This is counter-intuitive since people’s attention is generally deliberately
drawn to risk; they are not only told to relax in similar contexts.
To support users more effectively we developed a Firefox Add-On called
PassSec (see Fig. 1) to raise awareness in two stages: (1) highlight the password
field either in red with an icon to draw attention, or in green with a lock icon to
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Fig. 1. Screenshot of PassSec: highlighted password field and helpful dialogue as HTTPS
is not in place and the password field is focused.
reassure, as the web page loads; (2) bring up a helpful dialogue when the user is
about to enter a password insecurely. The add-on was developed iteratively using
a human-centred approach. We performed a field study with 31 participants and
found that PassSec significantly reduced the number of logins on unsafe web
pages.
2 Development Process
We derived a list of guidelines from the literature to inform effective implemen-
tation of PassSec’s security indicators [6, 11, 13, 21, 29, 31, 32]. PassSec’s raison
deˆtre is to raise awareness [17, 27], to make security visible, thereby helping peo-
ple to understand risk. Guidelines apply either to the indicator mechanism as a
whole, or are specific to the delivered message. The overall guidelines for warning
indicators are that they should meet the following requirements:
Be noticeable. According to the C-HIP model [29] and the human-in-the-
loop security framework [11], it is important to grab the user’s attention and
then maintain it [2, 12, 15, 34, 5].
Draw attention & reassure. The currently deployed HTTPS indicator and
address bar padlock icon only reassure. One cannot expect users to interpret the
lack of reassurance as something to be concerned about. Both must be provided.
Do not overstate. This risks habituation if people get used to dismissing
advice because it appears gratuitously. For example [19] report on warning sys-
tems in hospitals and explain that when warnings appear too often or falsely they
lead to confusion and irritation. Breznitz [7] explain that repeated alarms dull
reactions so it is vital for indicators to signal genuine problems. This admonition
is confirmed by [26].
Respect user autonomy. The final decision rests with the user, not with
the software. Wichman [28] points out that autonomy is a universal psychological
human need, which is related to well-being. Humans always strive to meet their
needs, so not respecting this is bound to be less than helpful.
Minimise annoyance. Any advice that intrudes too often can be counter-
productive. Politis et al. [20] tested speech warnings for drivers in terms of ur-
gency, annoyance and effectiveness and argue for the importance of minimising
annoyance in delivering warnings. Wogalter [30] also caution against causing an-
noyance since it interferes with the user’s ability to interpret the communication.
The message-specific guidelines for security indicators are that they should:
Be explicit. Wolf et al. [33] recommend using simple and explicit language
in communications. Wogalter et al. [31, 32] say interventions should identify the
problem, explain the consequences and offer directives for how to avoid the
problem. It is important for people to understand why wariness is recommended,
maximising personal relevance [22].
Offer alternatives. Users do not like to abandon their intended action
[16] so offering them an alternative (where possible) is preferable to advising
abandonment.
Be understandable. Many active warnings fail in this respect [12] so we
need to maximise understandability deliberately by using a human-centred de-
sign approach.
Be succinct & minimise effort. Too much text is likely to be daunting
and become ineffective [3]. Humans are “cognitive misers” [14] meaning that they
prefer to use intuition than to engage in effortful thinking. Moreover, we can not
rely on people clicking on explanatory links such as “More Information” [2] so
we should ensure that the most important information is displayed upfront.
These guidelines are not orthogonal. For example, understandability can help
to raise awareness and offering alternatives minimises annoyance. On the other
hand, a respect for autonomy can be taken too far: it could be used to jus-
tify removing interventions altogether, but that would not align with the ‘raise
awareness’ guideline. In effect, for each design decision we had to rank the guide-
lines and use the most relevant one to guide our decision. This list helped us to
make optimal design decisions, acknowledging the trade-offs that were sometimes
unavoidable.
2.1 Design Decisions
When to Intervene? We identified relevant contexts for raising awareness.
For each, we evaluated whether the password would be at risk while entering
or sending (Table 1). We deliberately do not warn about certificate issues since
these are only relevant when the website itself is fake, as is the case of web-
sites masquerading as the genuine entities. Web browsers routinely warn about
certificate issues and there is no point replicating this.
Table 1. Risk in different contexts and how it is addressed.
Context At Risk Current With
Entry Send Browsers PassSec
HTTP e.g. http://edition.cnn.com Yes Yes – – Draw At-
tention
HTTPS with unencrypted main page
e.g. http://www.booking.com
Yes No – – Draw At-
tention
HTTPS e.g. https://www.amazon.
com
No No Reassures: lock icon Reassures
HTTPS with mixed passive content
[1] e.g. https://www.answers.com
No No Draw Attention: icon Reassures
HTTPS with mixed active content [1]
e.g. https://www.answers.com
No No Blocks active content,
shield icon
Reassures
HTTPS with certificate issues Maybe Maybe Active warning Reassures
Redirect to HTTPS. It is technically possible to forward users to the
secure web page automatically4, if available, but automatic redirecting might be
unnecessary if users do not plan to enter their password (not overstate). The
other option is to advise them to switch. We decided on the second approach to
let users decide, because it allows users to retain control: not treating them like
children (autonomy). It also allows users to learn about securing communications
and sustain awareness of insecure websites. Finally, it allows users to make the
decision to use the unsecured web page, which they might do because they know
that it is safe, despite appearances to the contrary (e.g. an internal company
website or due to a trash account being used for this web page) (autonomy). We
contemplated whether PassSec should provide an explanation or an easy-to-use
button to authorise redirection. While the first option might be preferable with
respect to raising awareness, we were concerned that it constituted too much
effort for the user (minimising effort). We thus provide a button.
Keep History. The next decision is related to whether to ask users whether
to switch to the HTTPS website every time an insecure web page is visited, or
only once per specific page. Both have advantages (better awareness when asked
each time) and disadvantages (likely to annoy). We incorporated a historical
function to store details of those web pages where the user decided to switch to
the secure option. Any time a user visits a web page that appears in the history,
PassSec automatically redirects them to the secure web page (minimising effort
& annoyance).
Intervention Strategy. PassSec deploys a two-stage approach to maximise
effectiveness. The first stage is a specific passive security indicator that appears
as soon as the web page is loaded to immediately draw attention to a problem.
To achieve this, password fields are highlighted either to raise awareness or to
provide reassurance (raise awareness & reassure). The second a helpful dialogue
4 One could e.g. use the HTTPS-Everywhere Firefox Add-On https://www.eff.org/
https-everywhere (last access: June 23, 2015)
appears next to the password field as soon as users start entering their password
(just-in-time). Noticeability and effectiveness were evaluated in the field study.
2.2 Security Indicator Design
In [10], we showed that the combination of a red background and a yellow icon
attracts attention effectively in an unsafe context (cf. Fig. 2). To reassure, we
gave the input field a green border and a padlock icon (cf. Fig. 2). This proposal
was developed through several iterations incorporating feedback from potential
users. We started off with a green check mark but that confused people as they
were accustomed to seeing it when they entered their data correctly. We settled
on a padlock icon since it was perceived to be security-related. A green border
was used instead of utilising a green background that was perceived to be too
intrusive. The obvious concern with colour coding is that colour-blind users will
be disadvantaged. It is true that the red background will not attract colour-
blind users’ attention as reliably, but the icon, being yellow, will serve to attract
their attention. By using two independent indicators we make it less likely that
colour-blind users will miss the signal.
!Password! ! !Password!
Fig. 2. Highlighting of password fields to draw attention (left) if HTTPS is not in place;
and to reassure (right) if HTTPS is in place.
2.3 Security Dialogue Design
The structure of the dialogues is based on Wogalter et al. [31, 32] who recom-
mend that such dialogues should consist of four core components: (1) Signal
word to attract attention, (2) Identification of problem, (3) Explanation of con-
sequences, and (4) Directives to avoid problem. While this structure is in line
with the guidelines, we adapted it slightly. First, we do not utilise one signal
word to attract attention (1). Here, we share the opinion of Bauer et al. [4] that
a signal word is not necessary but that a corresponding icon should suffice to
draw attention. As an icon is already used in the highlighted field, we decided not
to add another in the dialogue. Second, we provide additional information about
the problem and the consequences for those who want to learn more (under-
standability and raise awareness). We ensure, however, that the most important
information is available without any extra effort being expended. We decided to
formulate the identified problem (2) as headline.
Icons. Based on feedback on first mockups of our dialogues, we realised we
had to incorporate meaningful icons. Wolf et al. [33] advise the use of icons to
reduce the amount of text (minimise effort). Thus, instead of using headlines
for the different elements of our dialogues we use corresponding icons. The icons
were chosen from other areas to maximise ease of association with the type of
information being provided (understandable). We used a light bulb to denote
recommendations and the well-known “i” icon with blue background for infor-
mation. After some iterations with potential users, we settled on a spy icon to
depict the potential consequences.
Options. Users receiving dialogues have two options. One is to dismiss the
dialogue and the other is to detour to the safe route, which is only possible if
HTTPS is available. We facilitated the latter (secure) course of action by providing
a button with green font based on findings about the efficacy of colour in this
respect [10]. We allowed them to add exceptions when HTTPS was not available.
Background colour. We considered two background colours: neutral (grey)
or yellow. The first is less annoying while the second is more likely to be noticed.
We decided to go with the grey background since the dialogue already comes
with the password field highlighted in red. The design of a PassSec dialogue is
shown in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3. Design proposal for dialogues
2.4 Dialogue Content
We conducted a feasibility study in order to test the viability of different terms
for different aspects as well as different phrases for different parts of the inter-
vention to maximise understandability and effectiveness. We studied in surveys:
Term for ‘Eve’: The following terms were studied to find a common usage
term for what we understand by ‘Eve’: Unauthorised people, criminals, hack-
ers, attackers, and con men. The most promising common-usage term for ‘Eve’
turned out to be ‘unauthorised person’.
Headline. The following headlines were evaluated: ‘You are not protected
here’, ‘Your password is endangered here’, ‘The connection is not encrypted’ as
potential titles of the dialogue. ‘Your password is endangered here’ was promis-
ing, but it turned out that some people thought that ‘endangered’ was the wrong
term. Therefore, we rephrased this proposal to ‘It is insecure to enter a pass-
word’.
Consequences. A number of alternative phrases were mooted to find a com-
mon usage phrase that is concrete, understandable and effective in depicting
Eve’s actual action: access, capture, reveal, publish, forward, distribute personal
data as well as use, have access to, abuse the account/data at your account. To
describe her malicious actions in the consequence ‘access your personal data’ was
the preferred option. Furthermore, during the discussion we realised the impor-
tance of mentioning the password again to explain how access is granted. The
final consequence reads: ‘Your password could fall into the hands of unauthorised
persons and could be used to access your personal data’.
Recommendation. The recommendation depends on whether HTTPS is avail-
able, or not. The dialogue text recommends switching to HTTPS whenever pos-
sible. This is the only recommended option (see Fig. 3) and the consequence
is that the web page will, in future, always be opened using HTTPS. Note, we
decided to use the term ‘Secure mode’ instead of using the term HTTPS to avoid
technical terms and maximise understandability. The actual text is: “You should
always use secure mode (https). Click on the ‘secure mode’ button and you will
be redirected to secure mode automatically in the future.”
If HTTPS is not available, the risk can be reduced by not re-using the password
entered on this web page. Consequently, the text reads: “This website does not
offer a secure option (https). If you decide to log in anyway, you should at least
use a different password for other websites.” We are aware of the fact that this
lacks substance, but being more explicit and prescriptive would result in a long
paragraph and might lead to users not reading it at all (minimise effort and
annoyance).
Options. The options provided in the dialogue depend on whether HTTPS is
available, or not. The recommended option for our context is to open the web
page via HTTPS whenever available, that is, the secure option. If HTTPS is not
available, there are two options. The first is for the user to add an exception.
This ensures that the decision is recorded and PassSec does not annoy the user
by asking him or her to re-affirm every time they access the page. The other
option is for the user to dismiss the dialogue by clicking on ‘Close’. The risk
of the first option is that an HTTPS option might be available in the future
and the exception would prevent PassSec from checking for the availability of
HTTPS. On the other hand, if the exception is not added this will lead to a
dialogue appearing every time, which is bound to lead to annoyance.
Amount of visible text. To balance succinctness and understandability, we
show the headline, the entire consequence, and the first part of the recommenda-
tion (when HTTPS is available) as well as the entire recommendation (when HTTPS
is not available); with a link to more information. We ensure that the most im-
portant information is always visible and does not require any additional action
by the user as clicking on a link such as “More Information”.
2.5 Firefox Add-On
The described concepts were implemented as a Firefox Add-On called PassSec.
The dialogues are depicted in Figures 4 and 5. PassSec acts after the browser
has judged the web page (what the browser blocks, stays blocked). In summary,
PassSec satisfies the guidelines identified in Section 2 as depicted in Table 2.
It#is#insecure#to#enter#a#password#here!#
Secure#mode# Close#warning#
Your#password#could#fall#into#the#hands#of#an#
unauthorized#person#and#could#be#used#to#access#
your#personal#data.#
You#should#always#use#secure#mode#(h>ps).#
[more]#
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Fig. 4. A PassSec screenshot for when
HTTPS is available. The default version
is shown.
More%Informa+on%
This%website%does%not%provide%the%op+on%of%
entering%and%transmi7ng%your%password%securely%
(via%h=ps).%If%you%use%the%same,%or%a%similar,%
password%for%diﬀerent%websites,%and%your%
password%is%intercepted%on%an%insecure%page%like%
this%one,%it%can%be%used%to%log%into%your%other%
accounts%too.%[less]%
It%is%insecure%to%enter%a%password%here!%
Add%an%excep+on% Close%warning%
Your%password%could%fall%into%the%hands%of%an%
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(h=ps).%If%you%decide%to%log%into%this%website%
anyway,%you%should%use%a%diﬀerent%password%for%
other%websites.%
Fig. 5. A PassSec screenshot for when
HTTPS is not available. The expanded ver-
sion is shown.
Table 2. Mapping guidelines to PassSec Add-On design.
guideline how achieved
noticeability locate next to password field
draw attention & reassure highlight field and add icon
not overstate redirect not enforced
respects user autonomy user decides whether to redirect or not
minimise annoyance appear only when password field focused
explicit dialogue design
offer alternatives ’Secure mode’
understandability feasibility testing
be succinct ‘[more]’ links
minimise effort remember whitelist decisions
3 Field Evaluation
Testing security-related behaviour in a laboratory setting leads to unrealistic
and overly positive results. We thus carried out a field test to evaluate PassSec’s
noticeability, understandability and the succinctness of the dialogue text. Ac-
ceptability was also considered in terms of the System Usability Scale5 (SUS)
5 http://www.usability.gov/how-to-and-tools/methods/
system-usability-scale.html (last access: June 23, 2015)
and feedback questions as this would be a necessary pre-condition for PassSec’s
potential success in the future. One cannot test security-related behaviour reli-
ably in a laboratory setting since you get unrealistic and overly positive results.
3.1 Study Design
Participants were told that the study was part of our research into Internet-
related warnings but we did not specify the types of risky situations we were
interested in. The field study comprised three phases. Participants used a de-
activated Add-On to record baseline performance. After three to four weeks,
participants installed a logging PassSec. A link to a web page detailing the
functionality of PassSec, including information about the logging, was provided.
Two weeks later participants uninstalled PassSec and filled out an online survey.
The online survey elicited demographics, posed SUS usability-related questions
[8] and questions relating to PassSec acceptability and the choices they made
during their usage of PassSec.
3.2 Study Prototype
The Pre-Study Add-On logged the following information together with time-
stamps whenever users focused on a password field: (1) Hash of the domain (sub
and top level domain) of the visited website, (2) Whether this was done via
HTTPS, (3) Whether users submitted their password via HTTP and (4) Whether
HTTPS was available (if not used by default). The PassSec Add-On additionally
logged whether and which of the buttons in the dialogue were pressed, whether
participants clicked on the ‘more information’ link, whether they submitted their
passwords via HTTP or HTTPS. The hashed domains were destroyed once they were
tallied to support analysis to preserve the privacy of our participants.
3.3 Recruitment, Reimbursement, and Ethics
Flyers were distributed across town, emailed to mailing lists, posted on web pages
and to social networks. Those we reached were asked to advertise the study to
get more participants, using a snowball approach. We did not pay participants
but they could win one of two iPad minis if they participated in all three phases.
Guidelines on ethical issues regarding research involving humans are provided by
an ethics commission at the host University. The relevant requirements for this
research relating to respondent consent and data privacy were satisfied. Logged
data, as well as survey data, was not linked to individuals and only used for
the purposes of this research. Visited domain details were hashed. Participants
could withdraw at any time and request that their stored logs be deleted.
4 Results
In total, 51 participants installed the Pre-Add-On and 37 installed the PassSec
Add-On. The final online survey was completed by 31 participants (sixteen fe-
male and fifteen male), whose data informed our analysis. The average age was
31, ranging from 19 to 73 with a standard deviation of 10.64. Out of the 31
participants, 14 people had something to do with IT (e.g. postgraduate or un-
dergraduate degree). The free-text responses were independently coded by two
of the authors using an inductive coding approach. Both reviewed the answers
and identified categories from participants’ responses. These were discussed and
iteratively developed.
4.1 Noticeability
There are two ways of testing noticeability. If one tests something in the lab you
can use eye-tracking equipment to see if people look at the part of the screen
where the dialogue appears, or you can ask people if they saw it. With a field
evaluation you cannot do this, so you have to use an indirect measure to detect
noticeability. In our case we tested whether people carried out fewer insecure
actions with the PassSec dialogues appearing. If we see a reduction in insecure
actions, one can assume that the dialogue must have been noticed, and affected
behaviour. We studied the impact of PassSec on participants’ behaviour. For
the purposes of this discussion we will use the following terms: for access via
HTTP we will use the term insecure and for access via HTTPS we will use the term
secure. Table 3 presents participants (P), attempting (A) to login to websites on
different domains (D) in phase-1 (Pre-Add-On) and phase-2 (PassSec). Fig. 6
provides an overview of participants’ behaviour with PassSec (based on the logs
and survey responses).
Table 3. Number of insecure login attempts with and without PassSec.
HTTP Login At-
tempts
By Partici-
pants
At Domains
HTTPS Available 476 19 19
HTTPS Available (PassSec) 30 9 15
HTTPS Unavailable 105 7 9
HTTPS Unavailable (PassSec) 87 19 24
Insecure logins (HTTPS available:): In total there were 476 insecure login
attempts executed by 19 participants on 19 different domains. With PassSec
there were 30 insecure login attempts by nine participants on 15 different do-
mains. Seven of these attempts happened after the participant had previously
switched to ‘secure mode’ to log in. This might have happened if participants
used PassSec on different devices. Seven of the nine participants subsequently
switched to secure mode. One participant only logged in once insecurely (he/she
did not return to the website thereafter). Another logged in five times on the
same insecure website. For the evaluation, we considered for each participant
(who – at least once – logged in insecurely) the difference between insecure login
attempts without and with PassSec. We first used the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
to determine whether these differences were normally distributed. This hypothe-
ses had to be rejected (p = 0.011, p < 0.001). Therefore we applied a one-tailed
Wilcoxon signed-rank test to determine statistical significance. These differences
differ from zero in a highly significant manner (p < 0.001). Thus PassSec was
successful.
Switch to HTTPS: 17 participants switched to secure mode a total of 43 times.
Ten did so whenever the option was offered. In the online survey participants
were asked why they did not switch to the ‘Secure Mode’ (if applicable). Five
of the seven participants who failed to switch stated that they always switched
to the ‘secure mode’ before they logged in and two stated that they switched to
secure version of the website themselves.
Insecure logins (HTTPS unavailable:) There were 105 insecure login at-
tempts on nine different domains without PassSec. Seven participants did this
at least once. There were 87 login attempts on 24 domains with PassSec. Fifteen
participants did this at least once.
Exceptions Added: Ten exceptions were added by five participants. Partic-
ipants were asked to share their reasons for adding exceptions. One participant
cited the irrelevance of the dialogue for the specific website. Another said that
he/she was annoyed by the dialogue. Three said they had no alternative because
they wanted to log into their account so abandonment was not an option. Some
entries in the logfiles showed that dialogues were ignored whereas the expected
log entry detailing the dialogue was missing. We tried to reproduce this excep-
tion and noticed that we had failed to anticipate the fact that some people allow
the browser to store their passwords. In this case the browser populates the cre-
dentials automatically and the dialogue would not appear since it is triggered
only when the password is focused.
Background colour: The survey contained a screenshot of the dialogue, as
shown in Fig. 4 and one with the same content but with a yellow background. We
asked participants to rate their appeal and ability to grab attention and asked
which one they would recommend. In terms of appeal and recommendation,
both performed equally. With respect to grabbing attention, the yellow one was
much preferred. We tested the difference in grabbing attention with a two-tailed
Wilcoxon signed-rank test and it reached significance with p = 0.028.
4.2 Understandability and Succinctness
Participants were asked whether the message texts were easy to understand.
On a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very understandable), the median of the
answers was 4. For the boxplot see Fig. 7. Participants were also asked whether
they were aware of the PassSec recommendation to consider changing their other
passwords One was indeed aware of the message text but 23 were not and two
were unsure. We also asked whether they changed their password based on the
recommendation. Seven answered ‘no’ and 19 argued that there was no recom-
mendation.
Confusion regarding the ‘Close’ button was identified from the free text an-
swers on feedback. Some participants seemed unsure of the consequences of click-
Fig. 6. Impact of PassSec on participants behaviour when faced with either of the
messages (P=Participants, D=Domains, A=Attempts/ Number of Actions).
ing on this button. It was sometimes interpreted as “leave this web page”. Par-
ticipants were asked whether the dialogues had the right amount of text. On a
scale from 1 (totally agree) to 5 (totally disagree), the median of the answers
is 2. For the boxplot see Fig. 7. The survey also contained a screenshot of a
shorter message text version (only headline and buttons and a link to get more
information) and a long version (as shown in Fig. 4). Participants were asked
whether the long version should be displayed immediately, or not. The longer
version was preferred by the majority of participants (21 out of 31).
4.3 Acceptability
Satisfaction. PassSec received an SUS score of 81.91. A score over 80 implies
a good-to-excellent result. Besides the SUS score, we asked the participants sev-
eral questions about its usability. Responses and ratings are depicted in Fig. 7.
For most of the questions the rating was very good (median). This includes help-
fulness in detecting unsafe contexts, appreciating reassurance, not disturbing,
not irritating, and not annoying.
Intention to use PassSec in future. 18 participants wanted to continue
to use PassSec after the study; and ten were undecided. Three did not plan to
use it in future (all male). Examples of positive comments were: ‘easy to notice’,
‘increased attention that passwords are also requested on HTTP websites’, ‘feeling
more secure’, ‘does not disturb me but helpful’, and ‘easy to switch to HTTPS’.
Examples of negative comments: ‘too few technical details’ ‘Firefox was only
used to participate in the study’, ‘design should be improved first’, ‘other Add-
Ons installed such as https-everywhere’, ‘slows down browser’, and ‘not enough
Fig. 7. Result for the survey questions related to amount and understandability of the
provided text, as well as satisfaction related questions.
protection’. We categorised them as negative and positive and not according the
three groups (wants to use it, not decided, does not want to use it again) because
in all three groups we found both negative and positive arguments.
Nice to have features. In order to collect input regarding possible fu-
ture functionality and modifications, we requested suggestions for improvement
from the participants. They responded: ‘cover more critical form fields; e.g. bank
account details’, ‘allow users to enable HTTPS everywhere’, ‘provide more infor-
mation about algorithms/criteria’ ‘improve performance’, ‘not easy enough to see
whether HTTPS is available or not’, ‘option to close does not function as expected’
(as the dialogue is displayed every time the password field is focused) and ‘im-
prove recommendation for insecure situation’. Furthermore, we provided a list of
possible form fields which could also trigger PassSec dialogues in future versions.
Bank account number and credit card were selected 28 times, TANs 25 times,
email addresses 16 times, postal addresses 15 times, and name 13 times.
5 Discussion
Noticeability: PassSec significantly reduced the number of insecure login at-
tempts. Most participants who logged in insecurely either dismissed the dialogue
or added an exception. The dialogues must have been noticed. It also became
clear that the highlighting of the password field was insufficient indication since
participants with stored passwords logged in despite the password field being
highlighted in red. Thus, in PassSec 2.0 we need to ensure messages are also dis-
played in this context, to improve noticeability. There are actually two options:
(1) detect the auto-fill of the password field and then show the dialogue (not
two-stage but still passive) or (2) detect the auto-fill of the password field and
show the dialogue when user clicks the login button. In this case the login would
not be executed when clicked. It would be enabled again once the dialogue was
displayed (two-stage but active since it interferes with the user’s activity and
demands attention). Both require evaluation in a future study. The survey an-
swers indicate that noticeability could be further improved by using a yellow
background colour for the text which seems to improve noticeability without
increasing annoyance or decreasing appeal.
Understandability: The overall understandability rating was good but we
identified a number of areas for improvement. The semantics and consequences
of the ‘close’ and the ‘add exception’ buttons were unclear. There was no ex-
planation in the dialogue, an unfortunate omission. ‘Close’ may have confused
participants because it reappeared every time the user focused the password
field. This may also explain why one participant became annoyed by the dia-
logue. We propose renaming the ‘close’ button to ‘Ok, got it’ in PassSec 2.0, and
adding a sentence: ‘If you do not want to see this dialogue again, add an excep-
tion’. Moreover, we will ensure that the dialogue only appears once per page.
Another issue was the recommendation to ‘change’ passwords on other websites.
The phrase ‘If you decide to log into this website anyway, you should use a dif-
ferent password your other websites’ was unclear. We propose to rephrase this
to ‘If you decide to log into this website anyway and you use the same password
for other website accounts, you should change them immediately.’
Succinctness: Users accepted the amount of text and most voted against
showing less text. PassSec 2.0 will provide an option to switch to the short ver-
sion. Participants complained that it was difficult to distinguish between websites
that could be opened securely from websites which could not, at first glance. Ini-
tially the only difference was the green font versus the black font on the other
button. To make the difference more obvious, PassSec 2.0 will use a green back-
ground for the secure mode button and a red one for the exception button.
Acceptability: PassSec performed very well with respect to usability. The
free text answers revealed a number of positive comments revealing ease of use,
minimal disturbance and low annoyance. Many will continue to use PassSec, oth-
ers wanted their comments about usability addressed before they would consider
adoption. The main areas for improvement were performance and the amount of
information displayed. The performance issues were caused by the logging as well
as by the way that PassSec was implemented: It initially loaded the HTTP page,
then checked whether the user had previously elected to be redirected, and, if so,
loaded the HTTPS page. If not, it checked for the domain on the exception list.
The performance was particularly poor with slow Internet connections. This has
been improved in PassSec 2.0 by optimising the checks and directly loading the
HTTPS page if the website is in the secure mode list. We plan to extend the pro-
vided information and to provide a link to the website in the ‘More information’
part of the dialogue.
All participants recommended extending the mechanism to cover other kinds
of data entry. PassSec 2.0 identifies banking data related fields as well as name,
address, and email address fields. While most of these issues can, and will, be
addressed, there is a trust issue that appears when trying to recruit users. People
tend to mistrust Add-Ons in general, since they do not know whether additional
information is collected. This issue can be addressed if PassSec’s functionality is
integrated into browsers.
Limitations: Participants used PassSec for different lengths of time due to
recruitment difficulties and a fixed end date. Due to the fact that we conducted
a field evaluation, we do not know whether we logged data only from the actual
participant or whether he/she shared the device with others (which six stated
they did, three on a daily basis). Participants were told that we were going to log
their actions, and this might have influenced their behaviour, perhaps biasing
them towards behaving more securely than usual.
6 Related Work
Researchers have come up with a variety of innovative mechanisms to make
users aware of the dangers to their data while using the Internet. Based on the
literature there seem to be three ways of approaching this problem: (1) Educating
web surfers, (2) passive (non-blocking) security indicators, and (3) using active
(blocking) warnings that interrupt the user’s current workflow. A prominent
educational approach is Anti-Phishing Phil by Sheng et al. [24]. Their game
was designed to help users to differentiate between secure and fake URLs in a
playful way. They were able to show that their approach was superior to existing
teaching material. As other Phishing detection mechanisms cannot provide 100%
protection, it is important not to discount the benefits of education; it is an
essential first step in making users more aware of threats. To warn about insecure
communications, technology can reliably check whether HTTPS is in place or
not and then either reassure or warn, augmenting the educational approach.
Some notable approaches in the field of passive approaches are LinkExtend6 and
research such as published by Shepherd et al. [25]. LinkExtend is a Firefox Add-
On considering many different security indicators including whether HTTPS is in
place or not. However, it displays the relevant information at the top of the web
browser while other research has shown that indicators in the address bar are
unlikely to be noticed [2, 12, 15, 34]. Their approach is unlikely to be effective.
Active warnings have been studied e.g. by Brustoloni and Villamar´ın-Salomo´n
[9]. They evaluated their approach in a user study with 26 participants and this
led to participants being more risk averse. The active approach is likely to annoy
people in our case as they would get a warning even though they only want to
surf on the corresponding page. Maurer et al. [18] use a mix of passive and active
6 https://addons.mozilla.org/de/firefox/addon/linkextend-safety-kidsafe-site/
(last access: June 23, 2015)
warnings. A warning dialogue is displayed whenever critical data type fields are
focused and the corresponding website is not yet white listed. They call their
approach “semi-blocking” as it does not actively interrupt the user’s current
workflow but requires deliberate action before submission is possible. Their main
purpose is to make users aware that they are about to enter sensitive data and
that they should make sure it is transmitted securely and the website is not a
Phishing website. Users can elect to add the web page to a whitelist in order
to reduce warnings, or just dismiss the warning. The system aimed to reduce
warnings and only display them when really required in order to reduce both
annoyance and minimise habituation effects. Their solution was comprehensibly
tested, both in the lab and in the field. In the lab, they tested whether people
could detect Phishing web sites with the help of their warning system. In the
seven day field study they focused on how their approach was perceived by real
users. As opposed to our work, their field study did not quantitatively evaluate
whether the tool reduced insecure behaviours in the wild but rather on whether
the number of warnings decreased over time.
In summary, education is definitely worthwhile in our context but augmenting
it with warnings is likely to improve matters even further. Existing approaches
proposing passive and passive indicators have their limitations. The approach
that most closely mirrors ours is the semi-blocking approach written about by
Maurer et al. [18]. Their main focus was on masquerading websites. They have
yet to test its effectiveness in reducing insecure behaviours in the field.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We developed a Firefox Add-On, called PassSec, to effectively support users
in detecting insecure communications. By ensuring that we satisfied a number
of guidelines identified from the literature, and by applying a human-centered
design approach (both for the content and design of its dialogue) we were able
to achieve our aim. PassSec significantly reduced the number of insecure logins.
We have identified ways to improve PassSec 2.0. We delivered dialogues using a
Firefox Add-On, but it would be preferable for this functionality to be embedded
within current browsers. The results for the first phase of the field study indicated
that passwords are at risk in many situations and it became clear that such an
Add-On could lead to more secure behaviour. While PassSec is not the first
Add-On to attempt to support users in this respect, it is, to the best of our
knowledge the first that has been evaluated in a field study which is as close
to ecological validity as is possible in a controlled field study. For future work,
we plan to distribute PassSec 2.0. Since PassSec significantly reduced insecure
logins we hope that PassSec 2.0 will improve the situation even further.
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